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Abstract—Identifying the tasks a given piece of malware was
designed to perform (e.g. logging keystrokes, recording video,
establishing remote access, etc.) is a difficult and time-consuming
operation that is largely human-driven in practice. In this paper,
we present an automated method to identify malware tasks.
Using two different malware collections, we explore various
circumstances for each - including cases where the training
data differs significantly from test; where the malware being
evaluated employs packing to thwart analytical techniques; and
conditions with sparse training data. We find that this approach
consistently out-performs the current state-of-the art software for
malware task identification as well as standard machine learning
approaches - often achieving an unbiased F1 score of over 0.9.
In the near future, we look to deploy our approach for use by
analysts in an operational cyber-security environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Identifying the tasks a given piece of malware was designed
to perform (e.g. logging keystrokes, recording video, establish-
ing remote access, etc.) is a difficult and time consuming task
that is largely human-driven in practice [24]. The complexity
of this task increases substantially when you consider that
malware is constantly evolving, and that how each malware
instance is classified may be different based on each cyber-
security expert’s own particular background. However, auto-
mated solutions are highly attractive for this problem as it can
significantly reduce the time it takes to conduct remediation
in the aftermath of a cyber-attack.
Earlier work has sought to classify malware by similar
“families” which has been explored as a supervised classifica-
tion problem [2], [15], [16]. However, differences over “ground
truth” for malware families (e.g. Symantec and MacAfee
cluster malware into families differently) and the tendency
for automated approaches to primarily succeed at “easy to
classify” samples [19], [23] are two primary drawbacks of
malware family classification. More recently, there has been
work on directly inferring the tasks a malware was designed to
perform [12]. This approach leverages static malware analysis
(i.e. analysis of the malware sample conducted without execu-
tion, such as decompilation) and a comparison with a crowd-
source database of code snippets using a proprietary machine
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leaning approach. However, a key shortcoming of the static
method is that it is of limited value when the malware authors
encrypt part of their code – as we saw with the infamous Gauss
malware [14]. This work builds upon recent developments in
the application of cognitive models to intelligence analysis
tasks [18] and our own preliminary studies on applying cog-
nitive models to identify the tasks a piece of malware was
designed to perform [17], [27]. Specifically, the contributions
of this paper include,
• Experimental results illustrating consistent and signif-
icant performance improvements (in terms of preci-
sion, recall, and F1) of the instance-based cognitive
model approach when compared with various standard
machine learning approaches (including SVM, logis-
tic regression and random forests) for two different
sandboxes and for two different datasets.
• Experimental results showing a consistent and signif-
icant performance improvement of the instance-based
cognitive model and several other machine learning
approaches when compared to the current state-of-the-
art commercial technology (which is based on static
analysis).
• Experiments where we study cases where the malware
samples are mutated, encrypted, and use different
carriers - providing key insights into how our approach
will cope with operational difficulties.
• Experimental results illustrating that a cognitively-
inspired intermediate step of inferring malware fam-
ilies provides improved performance in the machine
learning and rule-based cognitive model (though no
significant change to the instance-based cognitive
model).
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II we state
the technical preliminaries used in the paper. In Section III
we introduce our cognitive-based approaches, describing the
algorithms and explaining our selection of parameter settings.
This is followed by a description of the baseline approaches
that we studied in our evaluation in Section IV-A and a
description of the two different dynamic malware sandbox
environments we used in Section IV-B. In Section V we present
our suite of experimental results which include experiments
involving samples discovered by Mandiant, Inc. in their APT1
report [21] and samples created using the GVDG [11] tool. Fi-
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nally, related work and conclusion are discussed in Section VI
and Section VII respectively.
II. TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES
Throughout this paper, we shall assume that we have a set
of malware samples that comprise a historical corpus (which
we shall denoteM) and each sample i ∈M is associated with
a set of tasks (denoted tasks(i)) and a set of attributes (denoted
attribs(i)). Attributes are essentially binary features associated
with a piece of malware that we can observe using dynamic
and/or static analysis while the tasks - which tell us the higher-
level purpose of the malware - must be determined by a human
reviewing the results of such analysis. As M comprises our
historical knowledge, we assume that for each i ∈ M both
tasks(i) and attribs(i) are known. For a new piece of malware,
we assume that we only know the attributes. We also note that
throughout the paper, we will use the notation | · | to denote
the size of a given set. Tables 1 and 2 provide an example of
the attributes and tasks based on the malware samples from
the Mandiant APT1 dataset (created from samples available
at [22], see also [21]). A full description of this dataset is
presented in Section V.
TABLE 1: Attributes extracted through automated malware
analysis
Attribute Intuition
usesDLL(X) Malware uses a library X
regAct(K) Malware conducts an activity in the registry, mod-
ifying key K.
fileAct(X) Malware conducts an activity on certain file X
proAct Malware initiates or terminates a process
TABLE 2: Sample of malware tasks
Task Intuition
beacon Beacons back to the adversary’s system
enumFiles Designed to enumerate files on the target
serviceManip Manipulates services running on the target
takeScreenShots Takes screen shots
upload Designed to upload files from the target
Throughout the paper, we will also often consider malware
families, using the symbol F to denote the set of all families.
Each malware sample will belong to exactly one malware
family, and all malware samples belonging to a given family
will have the same set of tasks. Hence, we shall also treat each
element of F as a subset of M.
III. ACT-R BASED APPROACHES
We propose two models built using the mechanisms of
the ACT-R (Adaptive Control of Thought-Rational) cognitive
architecture [1]. These models leverage the work on applying
this architecture to intelligence analysis problems [18]. In par-
ticular, we look to leverage our recently-introduced instance-
based (ACTR-IB) and rule-based (ACTR-R) models [17], [27].
Previous research has argued the ability of instance-based
learning in complex dynamic situations making it appropriate
for sensemaking [10]. On the other hand the rule-based learn-
ing is a more compact representation of associating samples
in memory with their respective families. In this section, we
review some of the major concepts of the ACT-R framework
that are relevant to these models and provide a description of
both approaches.
We leveraged features of the declarative memory and
production system of the ACT-R architecture to complete
malware task identification. These systems store and retrieve
information that correspond to declarative and procedural
knowledge, respectively. Declarative information is the knowl-
edge that a person can attend to, reflect upon, and usually
articulate in some way (e.g., by declaring it verbally or by
gesture). Conversely, procedural knowledge consists of the
skills we display in our behavior, generally without conscious
awareness.
Declarative Knowledge. Declarative knowledge is represented
formally in terms of chunks. Chunks have an explicit type, and
consist of an ordered list of slot-value pairs of information.
Chunks are retrieved from declarative memory by an activation
process, and chunks are each associated with an activation
strength which in turn is used to compute an activation
probability. In this paper, chunks will typically correspond to
a malware family. In the version of ACTR-IB where we do
not leverage families, the chunks correspond with samples in
the training data.
For a given chunk i, the activation strength Ai is computed
as,
Ai = Bi + Si + Pi (1)
where, Bi is the base-level activation, Si is the spreading
activation, and Pi is the partial matching score. We describe
each of these in more detail as follows.
Base-Level Activation (Bi): The base-level activation for
chunk i reflects the frequency of samples belonging to a
particular family in memory . More important, base-level is
set to the log of the prior probability (i.e., the fraction of
samples associated with the chunk) in ACTR-R; for instance-
based (ACTR-IB), we set it to a base level constant βi.
Spreading Activation (Si): The spreading activation for chunk
i is based on a strength of association between chunk i and
the current test malware sample being considered. The strength
of association is computed differently in both approaches and,
in some cognitive model implementations, is weighted (as is
done in ACTR-R of this paper).
Partial Matching (Pi): A partial matching mechanism com-
putes the similarity between two samples. In this work, it
is only relevant to the instance-based approach. Given a test
sample j, its similarity with a sample i in memory is computed
as a product of the mismatch penalty (mp, a parameter of the
system) and the degree of mismatch Mji. We define the value
of Mji to be between 0 and −1; 0 indicates complete match
while −1 complete mismatch.
As common with models based on the ACT-R framework,
we shall discard chunks whose activation strength is below a
certain threshold (denoted τ ). All the chunks with activation
greater than τ are denoted as Aj . Once the activation strength,
Ai, is computed for a given chunk, we can then calculate
the activation probability, Pri. This is the probability that
the cognitive model will recall that chunk and is computed
using the Boltzmann(softmax) equation [25], which we provide
below.
Pri =
(e
Ai
s )∑
j(e
Aj
s )
(2)
Here, e is the base of the natural logarithm and s is momentary
noise inducing stochasticity by simulating background neural
activation (this is also a parameter of the system).
A. ACT-R Instance-Based Model
The instance based model is an iterative learning method
that reflects the cognitive process of accumulating experiences
(in this case the knowledge base of training samples) and
using them to predict the tasks for unseen test samples. Each
malware instance is associated with a set of attributes. When
a new malware sample is encountered, the activation strength
of that sample with each sample in memory is computed
using Equation 1. The spreading activation is a measure of
the uniqueness of the attributes between a test sample i and
a sample j in memory. To compute the spreading activation
we compute the fan for each attribute a (fan(a) finds all
instances in memory with the attribute a) of the test sample
i. The Partial matching is computed as explained above. The
degree of mismatch is computed as the intersection between
the attribute vector of the given malware and each sample
in memory normalized using the Euclidean distance between
the two vectors. The retrieval probability of each sample j
in memory with respect to the test sample i is then computed
using Equation 2. This generates a probability distribution over
families. The tasks are then determined by summing up the
probability of the families associated with that task with an
appropriately set threshold (we set that threshold at 0.5, based
on rationality).
Algorithm 1 ACT-R Instance-based Learning
INPUT: New malware sample i, historical malware corpus
M.
OUTPUT: Set of tasks associated with sample i.
for query malware sample i do
for all j in M do
Bj = βj
Pj = mp× |attribs(i)∩attribs(j)|√|attribs(i)|×|attribs(j)|
sij = 0.0
for a ∈ attribs(i) do
if a ∈ attribs(j) then
sij += log(
|M|
|fan(a) |)
else
sij += log( 1|M| )
end if
end for
Sj =
∑
j
sij
|attribs(i)|
Calculate Aj as per Equation 1
end for
Calculate Prj as per Equation 2
Prf =
∑
j∈f s.t. Aj≥τ Prj
tp = {t ∈ T |Prf ≥ 0.5}
end for
B. ACT-R Rule-Based Model
In this version of ACT-R model we classify samples based
on simple rules computed during the training phase. Given a
malware training sample with its set of attributes a, along with
the ground truth value family, we compute pair of conditional
probabilities p(a|f) and p(a|¬f) for an attribute in a piece
of malware belonging (or not belonging) to family f . These
probabilistic rules (conditional probabilities) are used to set
the strength of association of the attribute with a family
(sa,f ). We use empirically determined Bayesian priors p(f)
to set the base-level of each family as opposed to using a
constant base-level for instance based. Only two components
of the activation function in Equation 1 are used, namely
base-level and spreading activation. Given the attributes for
current malware , we calculate the probability of the sample
belonging to each family according to Equation 2, generating
a probability distribution over families. The task are then
determined in a similar way to that of instance-based model.
Algorithm 2 ACT-R Rule-based Learning
INPUT: New malware sample i, historical malware corpus
M.
OUTPUT: Set of tasks associated with new sample i.
TRAINING:
Let X =
⋃
j∈M attrib(j)
for all a in X do
Compute the set of rules p(a|f) and p(a|¬f)
(where p(a|f) = |{i∈M∩f s.t. a∈attrib(i)}||f |
and p(a|¬f) = |{i∈M−f s.t. a∈attrib(i)}||M|−|f | )
end for
TESTING:
for all f ∈ F do
Bf = log(p(f)) (where p(f) =
|f |
|M| )
sa,f = 0.0
for all a ∈ attrib(i) do
sa,f = log(
p(a|f)
p(a|¬f) ); Sf =+
w×sa,f
|attribs(i)|
end for
Af = Bf + Sf
end for
Calculate Prf as per Equation 2
tp = {t ∈ T |pf ≥ 0.5}
C. Model Parameter Settings
The two proposed models leverage separate components of
the activation function. Table 3 provides a list of parameters
used for both the ACT-R models - we use standard ACT-R
parameters that have been estimated from a wide range of
previous ACT-R modeling studies from other domains [28] and
which are also suggested in the ACT-R reference manual [3].
The intuition behind these parameters is as follows. The
parameter s injects stochastic noise in the model. It is used to
compute the variance of the noise distribution and to compute
the retrieval probability of each sample in memory. The
mismatch penalty parameter mp is an architectural parameter
that is constant across samples, but it multiplies the similarity
between the test sample and the samples in knowledge base.
Thus, with a large value it penalizes the mismatch samples
more. It typically trades off against the value of the noise s
in a signal-to-noise ratio manner: larger values of mp lead
to more consistent retrieval of the closest matching sample
whereas larger values of s leads to more common retrieval of
poorer matching samples.The activation threshold τ determines
which samples will be retrieved from memory to make task
prediction decisions. The base level constant β is used to avoid
retrieval failures which might be caused due to high activation
threshold. The source activation w is assigned to each retrieval
to avoid retrieval failures for rule-based models.
TABLE 3: Parameters for the Cognitive models
Model Parameters
Instance Based Learn-
ing
β = 20 (base-level constant)
s = 0.1 (stochastic noise parameter)
τ = -10 (activation threshold)
mp = 20(mismatch penalty)
Rule Based learning s = 0.1 (stochastic noise parameter)
w = 16 (source activation)
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
A. Baseline Approaches
We compare the proposed cognitive models against a
variety of baseline approaches - one commercial package and
five standard machine learning techniques. For the machine
learning techniques, we generate a probability distribution
over families and return the set of tasks associated with a
probability of 0.5 or greater while the commercial software
was used as intended by the manufacturer. Parameters for all
baseline approaches were set in a manner to provide the best
performance.
Commercial Offering: Invencia Cynomix. Cynomix is a mal-
ware analysis tool made available to researchers by Invencia
industries [12] originally developed under DARPA’s Cyber
Genome project. It represents the current state-of-the-art in
the field of malware capability detection. Cynomix conducts
static analysis of the malware sample and uses a proprietary
algorithm to compare it to crowd-sourced identified malware
components where the functionality is known.
Decision Tree (DT). Decision tree is a hierarchical recursive
partitioning algorithm. We build the decision tree by finding
the best split attribute i.e. the attribute that maximizes the
information gain at each split of a node. In order to avoid
over-fitting, the terminating criteria is set to less than 5% of
total samples. Malware samples are tested by the presence and
absence of the best split attribute at each level in the tree till
it reaches the leaf node.
Naive Bayes Classifier (NB). Naive Bayes is a probabilistic
classifier which uses Bayes theorem with independent attribute
assumption. During training we compute the conditional prob-
abilities of a given attribute belonging to a particular family.
We also compute the prior probabilities for each family i.e.
fraction of the training data belonging to each family. Naive
Bayes assumes that the attributes are statistically independent
hence the likelihood for a sample S represented with a
set of attributes a associated with a family f is given as,
Pr(f |S) = P (f) × ∏di=1 Pr(ai|f), where d is the number
of attributes in a.
Random Forest (RF). Ensemble methods are popular clas-
sification tools. It is based on the idea of generating multiple
predictors used in combination to classify new unseen samples.
We use a random forest which combines bagging for each
tree with random feature selection at each node to split the
data thus generating multiple decision tree classifiers [4]. Each
decision tree gives its own opinion on test sample classification
which are then merged to generate a probability distribution
over families.
Support Vector Machine (SVM). Support vector machines
(SVM) was proposed by Vapnik [7]. SVM’s work by finding
a separating margin that maximizes the geometric distance
between classes. The separating margin is termed as hyper-
plane. We use the popular LibSVM implementation [5] which
is publicly available.
Logistic Regression (LOG-REG). Logistic regression clas-
sifies samples by computing the odds ratio. The odds ratio
gives the strength of association between the attributes and
the family like simple rules used in the ACT-R rule based
learning. We implement the multinomial logistic regression
which handles multi-class classification.
B. Dynamic Malware Analysis
Dynamic analysis studies a malicious program as it ex-
ecutes on the host machine. It uses tools like debuggers,
function call tracers, machine emulators, logic analyzers, and
network sniffers to capture the behavior of the program. We
use two publicly available malware analysis tools to generate
attributes for each malware sample. These tools make use of
a sandbox which is a controlled environment to run malicious
software.
Anubis Sandbox. Anubis [13] is an online sandbox which
generates an XML formated report for a malware execution in
a remote environment. It generates detailed static analysis of
the malware but provides less details regarding the behavior of
the malware on the host machine. Since it is hosted remotely
we cannot modify its settings.
Cuckoo Sandbox. Cuckoo [6] is a standalone sandbox im-
plemented using a dedicated virtual machine and more im-
portantly can be customized to suit our needs. It generates
detailed reports for both static as well as behavior analysis by
watching and logging the malware while its running on the
virtual machine. These behavior analysis prove to be unique
indicators for a given malware for the experiments.
C. Performance Evaluation
In our tests, we evaluate performance based primarily
on four metrics: precision, recall, unbiased F1, and family
prediction accuracy. For a given malware sample being tested,
precision is the fraction of tasks the algorithm associated with
the malware that were actual tasks in the ground truth. Recall,
for a piece of malware, is the fraction of ground truth tasks
identified by the algorithm. The unbiased F1 is the harmonic
mean of precision and recall. In our results, we report the
averages for precision, recall, and unbiased F1 for the number
of trials performed. Our measure of family accuracy - the
fraction of trials where the most probable family was the
ground truth family of the malware in question - is meant
to give some insight into how the algorithm performs in the
intermediate steps.
V. RESULTS
All experiments were run on Intel core-i7 operating at 3.2 GHz
with 16 GB RAM. Only one core was used for experiments.
All experimental results presented in this section are new and
have not been previously introduced.
A. Mandiant Dataset
Our first set of experiments uses a dataset based on the
the T1 cyber espionage group as identified in the popular
report by Mandiant Inc [21]. This dataset consisted of 132
real malware samples associated with the Mandiant report
that were obtained from the Contagio security professional
website [22]. Each malware sample belonged to one of 15
families including BISCUIT, NEWSREELS, GREENCAT and
COOKIEBAG. Based on the malware family description [21],
we associated a set of tasks with each malware family (that
each malware in that family was designed to perform). In
total, 30 malware tasks were identified for the given malware
samples (see Table 2). On average, each family performed 9
tasks.
We compared the four machine learning approaches with
the rule based and instance-based ACT-R models (ACTR-R
and ACTR-IB respectively). We also submitted the samples
to the Cynomix tool for automatic detection of capabilities.
These detected capabilities were then manually mapped to
the tasks from the Mandiant report. Precision and recall
values were computed for the inferred adversarial tasks. On
average the machine learning approaches predicted 9 tasks per
sample, ACTR-R predicted 9 tasks per sample and ACTR-IB
predicted 10 tasks. On the other hand Cynomix was able to
detect on average only 4 tasks.
Leave one out Cross-Validation(LOOCV)
In leave one out cross validation, for n malware samples,
we train on n − 1 samples and test on the remaining one.
This procedure was repeated for all samples and the results
were averaged. We performed this experiment using both
sandboxes and compared the results (see Fig. 1).
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Fig. 1: Average F1 and Family prediction comparisons for DT,
NB, LOG-REG, SVM, RF, ACTR-IB and ACTR-R for Anubis
(top) and Cuckoo (bottom).
The average F1 increases by 0.03 when we use the at-
tributes generated by the Cuckoo sandbox instead of Anubis.
The statistical significance results are as follows: for ACTR-IB
(t (132) = 1.94, p = 0.05), ACTR-R (t (132) = 1.39, p = 0.16),
RF (t (132) = 0.56, p = 0.57), SVM (t (132) = 1.95, p = 0.05),
LOG-REG (t (132) = 1.82, p = 0.07), NB (t (132) = 1.79, p
= 0.08) and DT (t (132) = 0.83, p = 0.4). But the significant
improvement was in the family prediction values with ACTR-
IB improving by 0.12 from 0.81 to 0.93 (t (132) = 3.86, p
< .001) and ACTR-R by 0.15 from 0.72 to 0.87 (t (132) =
3.78, p < .001) outperforming all other methods. Since having
behavior analysis helps in better task prediction as seen from
the comparison experiment, we use cuckoo sandbox for rest
of our experiments.
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Fig. 2: Average Precision, Recall, F1 and Family prediction
comparisons for LOG-REG, RF, SVM, ACTR-R, ACTR-IB
and INVINCEA.
Fig. 2 compares the performance of the five best perform-
ing methods from Fig. 1 and compares it with the Cynomix
tool of Invincea industries. ACTR-IB outperformed LOG-
REG, SVM, RF and ACTR-R; average F1 = 0.97 vs 0.85 (t
(132) = 7.85, p < .001), 0.9 (t (132) = 4.7, p < .001), 0.89
(t (132) = 5.45, p < .001) and 0.88 (t (132) = 5.2, p < .001)
respectively. Both the proposed cognitive models and machine
learning techniques significantly outperformed the Cynomix
tool in detecting the capabilities (tasks).
These three approaches (LOG-REG, SVM, RF) were
also evaluated with respect to predicting the correct family
(before the tasks were determined). ACTR-IB outperformed
LOG-REG, SVM, RF and ACTR-R; average family prediction
= 0.93 vs 0.84 (t (132) = 3.22, p < .001), 0.86 (t (132) =
3.13, p < .001), 0.86 (t (132) = 3.13, p < .001) and 0.89 (t
(132) = 2.13, p = .03) respectively.
Task Prediction without inferring families:
In the proposed models we infer the malware family first and
then predict the tasks associated with that family. However,
differences over “ground truth” for malware families in the
cyber-security community calls for a direct inference of tasks
without dependence on family prediction. In this section we
adapt the models to predict tasks directly without inferring
the family.
Fig. 3 shows the performance of the cognitive and machine
learning models without inferring the families. There is no
difference in the performance of ACTR-IB and ACTR-R
approaches as compared to Fig. 2 where we use families. On
the other hand direct task prediction reduces the F1 measure
of machine learning techniques on average by almost 0.1. This
is due to the fact, now instead of having a single classifier
for each family we have multiple classifiers for each task
that a malware sample is designed to perform. This not only
degrades the performance but also adds to the training time
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Fig. 3: Average Precision, Recall, and F1 comparisons for
LOG-REG, RF, SVM, ACTR-R and ACTR-IB without infer-
ring families.
for these methods. We compare the training time with increase
in training data for task prediction with/without inferring
families. Inferring families first reduces the training time
(see Fig. 4 (a)). On the other hand predicting tasks directly
significantly increases the training time for the machine
learning methods along for the rule-based ACT-R approach
(Fig. 4 (b)). Due to the issues with respect to performance
and training time, we consider inferring families first for rest
of the experiments. An important point to note is this has no
effect on the Instance-based model for both performance and
computation time.
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Fig. 4: Training time for LOG-REG, SVM, RF and ACTR-R
with(a) / without(b) inferring families.
B. GVDG Dataset
Fig. 5: GVDG User Interface
GVDG is a malware generation tool designed for the study
of computer threats [11]. It is capable of generating following
malware threats,
• File-virus
• Key-Logger
• Trojan-Extortionist
• USB-Worm
• Web Money-Trojan
Fig. 5 shows the GVDG user interface used for the
generation of malware samples. We can select the carrier
type and the tasks that we want the malware sample to
perform on the host machine. The tasks are represented as
payloads, while carrier is a functional template of specific
behavior which are the operational framework supporting and
enabling the task activity. In generating datasets with GVDG,
we specify families based on sets of malware with the same
tasks. Whether or not a family consists of malware with the
same carrier depends on the experiment. Further, GVDG also
has an option to increase “mutation” or variance among the
samples. We perform experiments analyzing the performance
of the proposed methods when the generated samples belong
to different carrier and same carrier types, as well as when
the samples are encrypted and mutated making task prediction
difficult. In all the experiments we consider 60% of the data
for training and 40% for testing. The results are averaged
across 10 trials. The Cynomix tool from Invencia was unable
to detect any tasks for the GVDG dataset, primarily due to
to its inability to find public source documents referencing
GVDG samples and also unable to generalize from similar
samples.
Different Carriers:
In this experiment, we generated 1000 samples for each
carrier type with low mutation. On average each carrier type
performs 7 tasks(payloads). Hence each carrier represents one
family for this experiment. Both random forest and ACTR-IB
model were able to predict the tasks and family with F1
measure of 1.0 outperforming LOG-REG 1 vs 0.91 , SVM
1 vs 0.95 and ACTR-R 1 vs 0.95. All results are statistical
significant with (t (1998) ≥ 8.93, p < .001)(Fig. 6). Also for
family prediction ACTR-IB and RF outperformed LOG-REG
1 vs 0.92, SVM 1 vs 0.92 and ACTR-R 1 vs 0.95 (t (1998)
≥ 8.93, < .001). These results are not surprising given that
different carrier(family) types have high dissimilarity between
them. Also, samples belonging to the same carrier have on
average 60% of similar attributes.
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Fig. 6: Average Precision, Recall, F1 and Family prediction
comparisons for LOG-REG,SVM, RF, ACTR-R and ACTR-
IB for different carrier samples.
Different Carriers-Mutation:
For this case, we generate the same samples as in the previous
experiment but with maximum mutation between samples
belonging to the same carrier. We generated 1000 samples for
each carrier with maximum mutation. In this case ACTR-IB
had an average F1 of 1 outperforming LOG-REG 1 vs 0.83,
SVM 1 vs 0.88 , RF 1 vs 0.96 and ACTR-R 1 vs 0.92 (t (1998)
≥ 7, p < .001)(Fig. 7). Also for family prediction ACTR-IB
outperformed LOG-REG 1 vs 0.85, SVM 1 vs 0.88 , RF 1 vs
0.95 and ACTR-R 1 vs 0.92 (t (1998) ≥ 7, p < .001).
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Fig. 7: Average Precision, Recall, F1 and Family prediction
comparisons for LOG-REG,SVM, RF, ACTR-R and ACTR-
IB.
High mutation induces high variance between samples
associated with the same carrier making the classification task
difficult. High mutation samples belonging to same carrier have
only 20% of common attributes as compared to 60% for low
mutation.
Leave one carrier out cross-validation:
To see how the models generalize to unseen malware fam-
ily(carrier), we performed a leave-one-carrier-out comparison
(using high mutation samples), where we test the models
against one previously unseen malware carrier. ACTR-IB per-
forms better or on par with all other baseline approaches for
all the carriers. It clearly outperforms all the approaches in
recalling most of the actual tasks (40%) (see Figure 8). ACTR-
IB has shown to generalize for unseen malware families [17].
This case is difficult given the fact that the test family is
not represented during training, hence task prediction depends
on associating the test family with the training families that
perform similar tasks.
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Fig. 8: Average F1 values for 5 malware carriers (above) and
the average precision, recall and F1 across all carriers (below)
for LOG-REG, SVM, RF, ACTR-R and ACTR-IB..
Same Carrier:
As seen in the previous experiments, different carrier types
makes the task easier because of less similarity between them.
We now test the performance, on same carrier type performing
exactly one task. Since there are 17 tasks in the GVDG tool,
we generate 100 samples for each task for carrier type File-
virus. In this experiment each task represents one family.
Thus in total we have 1700 samples. We do the 60-40 split
experiment. From Fig. 9 ACTR-IB had an average F1 of 0.95
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Fig. 9: Average Precision, Recall, F1 and Family prediction
comparisons for LOG-REG,SVM, RF, ACTR-R and ACTR-
IB.
outperforming LOG-REG 0.95 vs 0.84, SVM 0.95 vs 0.87, RF
0.95 vs 0.90 and ACTR-R 0.95 vs 0.92 (t (678) ≥ 1.52 , p ≤
0.13). Since each family performs exactly one task the family
prediction is similar to F1. Using the same carrier for each
payload makes the task difficult as they have high similarity
between them.
Same Carrier-Encryption:
The GVDG tool provides the option for encrypting the
malware samples for the File-virus carrier type. We use
this option to generate 100 encrypted malware samples
for each task(payload) and use them as test data with the
unencrypted versions from the same carrier experiment as
training samples. From Fig. 10 ACTR-IB had an average F1
of 0.9 outperforming LOG-REG 0.9 vs 0.8, SVM 0.9 vs 0.8,
RF 0.9 vs 0.74 and ACTR-R 0.9 vs 0.88 (t (1698) ≥ 2.36
, p ≤ 0.02). Encrypting malware samples morphs the task
during execution making it difficult to detect during analysis.
Hence the drop in performance as compared to non-encrypted
samples. We note that SVM performs better than RF likely
because it looks to maximize generalization.
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Fig. 10: Average Precision, Recall, F1 and Family prediction
comparisons for LOG-REG,SVM, RF, ACTR-R and ACTR-
IB.
VI. RELATED WORK
Identification of malicious software. The identification of
whether or not binary is malicious [8], [26] is important and
can be regarded as a “first step” in the analysis of suspicious
binaries in the aftermath of a cyber-attack. However, we note
that as many pieces of malware are designed to perform
multiple tasks, that successful identification of a binary as
malicious does not mean that the identification of its associated
tasks will be a byproduct of the result - and hence this is
normally the case, which has led to some of the other related
work described in this section.
Malware family classification. There is a wealth of existing
work on malware family identification [2], [15], [16]. The
intuition here is that by identifying the family of a given piece
of malware, an analyst can then more easily determine what
it was designed to do based on previously studied samples
from the same family. However, malware family classification
has suffered from two primary draw-backs: (1) disagreement
about malware family ground truth as different analysts (e.g.
Symantec and MacAfee) cluster malware into families differ-
ently; and (2) previous work has shown that some of these
approaches mainly succeed in “easy to classify” samples [19],
[23], where “easy to classify” is a family that is agreed upon
by multiple malware firms. In this paper, we infer the specific
tasks a piece of malware was designed to carry out. While we
do assign malware to a family as a component of our approach,
to avoid the two aforementioned issues as the family partition
is done so probabilistically and the result ground truth is the
focus of our comparison (though we show family prediction
results as a side-result). Further, we also describe and evaluate
a variant of our instance-based method that does not consider
families and yields a comparable performance to our instance-
based method that does consider families.
Malware task identification. With regard to direct inference
of malware tasks, the major related work include the software
created by the firm Invincea [12] for which we have included
a performance comparison. Additionally, some of the ideas
in this paper were first introduced in [17], [27]. However, that
work primarily focused on describing the intuitions behind the
cognitive modeling techniques and only included experimental
evaluation on one dataset (the Mandiant APT1 dataset) and
one sandbox environment (Anubis) with a comparison amongst
only the instance based approach, the rule-based cognitive
model, the standard decision tree, and the naive Bayes rea-
soner. The experimental evaluation in this paper was designed
to be much more thorough to pave the way toward deployment
of the approach for use by cyber-security analysts.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced an automated method that
combines dynamic malware analysis with cognitive modeling
to identify malware tasks. This method obtains excellent preci-
sion and recall - often achieving an unbiased F1 score of over
0.9 - in a wide variety of conditions over two different malware
sample collections and two different sandbox environments -
outperforming a variety of baseline methods. Currently, our
future work has three directions. First, we are looking to
create a deployed version of our approach to aid cyber-security
analysts in the field. Second, we look to enhance our malware
analysis to also include network traffic resulting from the
sample by extending the capabilities of the sandbox. Finally,
we also look to address cases of highly-sophisticated malware
that in addition to using encryption and packing to limit static
analysis, also employ methods to “shut down” when run in a
sandbox environment [20]. We are exploring multiple methods
to address this such as the recently introduced technique of
“spatial analysis” [9] that involves direct analysis of a malware
binary.
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